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Introduction
I will be talking today about the limits of cognitive science. I won’t be talking about contingent shortcomings that could perhaps be remedied with, say, more time, resources, or ingenuity. Rather, I will be concerned 
with limitations that are “baked into” the very enterprise. The main blind 
spot, I will argue, is consciousness—but not for the reasons typically given.
Cognitive science has experienced significant growth in the last de-
cades, so why should one consider consciousness elusive—or at any rate 
more problematic than other objects of scientific study? In the philosophy 
of mind literature, there are many thought-experiments and arguments 
that aim to establish that (at least some aspects of) consciousness cannot 
be captured by regular scientific explanation. The most memorable, in my 
estimate, is Frank Jackson’s (1982, 1986) knowledge argument.
Jackson argues that, if a neuroscientist named Mary were to be raised 
in a black-and-white environment from birth and taught everything about 
vision and colour science, her extensive knowledge would still not enable 
her to know, in advance of a genuine encounter, what it’s like to see red. 
1 Editor’s Note: The Toronto Semiotic Circle lecture represented in this slightly edited 
transcript was co-hosted by the Ryerson University Department of Philosophy and the 
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She can learn much about that colour in her monochrome setting. But, 
even with access to a completed neuroscience, she will appreciate the 
experiential quality of red only upon her release.
I’m a big fan of this argument. Jackson’s scenario, however, calls on 
some science-fiction that gives me pause. For one thing, doctoring a black-
and-white environment is admittedly just an idealization. For instance, if 
one worries that Mary might experience red by seeing her blood, one can 
alter the story so that she wears special colour-negating goggles and so 
on. Alas, these ad hoc fixes make the starting scenario far-fetched. More 
problematically, the story requires Mary to be maximally informed, but 
no single human can be maximally informed about any science—let alone 
all the sciences needed to exhaustively comprehend color vision.
As a result of these outlandish assumptions, there will always be those 
(like Dennett 1991: 399–400) who suspect that the knowledge argument’s 
conclusion is dubious. That is a shame, since in principle the qualitative 
dimension of consciousness should be something that we are all familiar 
with. I therefore want to avoid speculative detours and instead articulate 
the basic philosophic worry using only ordinary premises.
Current work in philosophy of mind can sometimes seem arcane, so 
my goal today will be to answer the question: why bother? I have spent 
a whole book and several articles trying to make sense of the qualitative 
dimension of consciousness, but there is no point in trying to sell a solution 
unless we have first established (independently of any academic literature) 
that there is a real problem to solve. So, if I can’t convey my position in 
under an hour, I can at least convey the issue that motivates it.
For what it’s worth, I have decided not to rehearse any previous 
material, so everything I will say today is a fresh gloss—one that I am 
fortunate to make with the benefit of some hindsight. So, if anything I say 
sounds incomplete, it is probably because it is. For those wishing to fill 
the gaps, the companion piece to this talk is the book by the same name 
(Champagne 2018).
The Ordinary Knowledge Argument,  
Less Comfortable Version
With that orientation and caveat in mind, let me start with two premises 
which I trust everyone will accept. First: humans are capable of having 
orgasms. We can add to this another uncontroversial claim, namely that 
humans are capable of using language. Putting aside science-fiction, an 
acknowledgement of these two claims generates a problem. Let me out-
line how.
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The human experience of orgasms and the human use of language both 
unfold diachronically, so there had to be a time when both were absent 
from one’s cognitive life. One consequence of this unfolding in time is 
that most of us learned the word “orgasm” before we actually experienced 
one. The usual developmental timeline, then, seems to have three distinct 
segments. First, there was a period when one did not have any orgasm 
and did not even know the word for that. Next in line was a period when 
one generally knew the word but still had not undergone the particular 
experience it picks out. Finally, there came a time when one underwent 
one’s first orgasm, thereby augmenting one’s earlier mastery of the relevant 
bit of language with a first-hand experience.
I am not concerned with how long each segment of this timeline 
lasted, but only with the possibility that events can unfold in that order: 
total ignorance, followed by hearsay, and finally first-hand appreciation. 
Some individual lives no doubt unfold differently. One could, for instance, 
experience an orgasm before learning the word for that. Nevertheless, 
given the (arguably standard) sequence of events just outlined, the second 
segment becomes philosophically interesting.
There was presumably a time in one’s life when, despite never having 
had an orgasm, one knew how to deploy the word in appropriate contexts; 
using it grammatically in conversations, and so on. In other words, passing 
the Turing test in front our peers, we faked it until we made it.
Now, suppose that, in a bid to improve one’s linguistic performance, 
one asked a more experienced friend to describe in more detail what it’s 
like to have an orgasm. A person in the know might give the following 
answer: you become all warm, it tingles, you momentarily forget where 
you are, your body stiffens, it’s like the feeling of release that you get in a 
hot shower after a hard workout, and so on.
Such replies can vary, but they all essentially try to reason by analogy. 
One takes a qualitative feel and attempts to convey the quality in question 
by appealing to similar qualitative feels. You will notice that this com-
municative strategy is premised on two assumptions. First, it is assumed 
that the descriptions each pick out experiences that the question-asker has 
already undergone—otherwise these descriptions will in turn be unknown 
and thus compound the starting problem by leading to a regress. If one has 
never felt a tingling sensation, that analogy will not be very informative. 
Second, it is assumed that experiences sum, such that many conjoined 
descriptions can shed light on a single qualitative experience. An orgasm 
is a unitary experience, but we deploy a battery of adjectives to describe it.
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Our everyday talk nevertheless makes it seem that, if one is able 
to analyze the feeling of an orgasm as the feeling of heat, the feeling of 
tingling, and the feeling of slight dizziness (say), one can simply add a 
plus sign between those parts to obtain the sum. This is, however, wildly 
implausible. I might say, in an ordinary conversation, that wasabi is like 
tasting hot sauce while sneezing. However, someone who tries to recreate 
that experience by sipping on Tabasco sauce and blowing her nose will 
not succeed in producing the taste of wasabi. The same goes for orgasms, 
which (thankfully?) cannot be produced by jointly doctoring sensations 
of heat, tingling, and slight dizziness. This fact alone should cast doubt on 
the ability of language to do the referential work required.
This dubious tally and threat of regress notwithstanding, what mat-
ters for my purpose is that a word is explained with still more words. 
This attempt to explain a word with words may look circular, but the 
truth is that a large enough circle can achieve wonders. A dictionary, 
for example, does just that. Yet, what has been said about the translation 
manual of John Searle’s (1980) Chinese room is equally applicable to a 
dictionary in one’s native language, namely that, without an appreciation 
of the referents, “[t]he trip through the dictionary would amount to a 
merry-go-round, passing endlessly from one meaningless symbol or 
symbol-string (the definiens) to another (the definiendum), never com-
ing to a halt on what anything meant” (Harnad 1990: 339). If a network 
of word-to-word relations is sufficiently large and sufficiently systematic, 
it can provide knowledge, albeit only knowledge of the sort that Bertrand 
Russell (1910–1911) called “knowledge by description”. What is missing, 
ostensibly, is “knowledge by acquaintance”.
Now that we have introduced this important analytical distinction, 
imagine that the person wishing to know more about orgasms decided 
to learn all the knowledge by description that one can possibly acquire 
about that subject. Since people can write down their first-person reports, 
such an armchair student of orgasms would have access to texts aiming 
to be maximally descriptive (like something written by a trained phe-
nomenologist), as well as texts aiming to be maximally evocative (like 
something composed by a poet or romance novelist). In addition, one 
could read biology textbooks, watch video footage of people undergoing 
the experience, and whatever else isn’t an orgasm itself. The question is: 
Could such theoretical learning, pushed to its maximum, ever allow one 
to know what it’s like to have an orgasm?
To gauge the likelihood of this, imagine that one’s high school friend 
returned from a long reading session at the library to boast that he/she 
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knew—without ever having one—what it feels like to have an orgasm. 
How seriously would we take that claim to knowledge? Surely, most of us 
would scoff at such a boast.
Recall that, unlike a color-blind neuroscientist, most of us occupied 
this position at some point. There was presumably a period in one’s lifetime 
when, despite never having had an orgasm, one knew the word. Yet, when 
our friends confessed that they had recently felt something extraordinary, 
few of us turned to a study of books in order to fill this intriguing gap in 
our knowledge. The shorter route of first-hand experience seemed, by 
comparison, much more fun. So, when one finally underwent the experi-
ence, did one learn something conveyed exclusively by that experience?
I surmise that each of us privately thought “So that’s what an orgasm 
feels like!” Only subsequent philosophical schooling can make one hesi-
tant about the genuine novelty of this experience—and only philosophical 
schooling could make one take seriously the suggestion that ignorance 
about a conscious experience can always be remedied with more book 
learning.
The scientific knowledge housed in a library is not useless, but when it 
comes to consciousness it ostensibly leaves something out. Technological 
improvements can give us better brain scans, finer-grained behavioural 
descriptions, and maybe even sharper verbal reports. But, if the present 
considerations are correct, there are principled reasons why such improve-
ments will fall short of conveying what a given conscious episode feels 
like. Unless, that is, scientific papers on orgasms always end by saying: 
“Oh, and go have one.”
The Ordinary Knowledge Argument,  
More Comfortable Version
If ordinary and scientific descriptions cannot fully convey the feel of a 
conscious experience, then what is being left-out? The catch-all term for 
this residue, originated by the American polymath and pioneer in semiot-
ics Charles Sanders Peirce, is “qualia”. This term, which is the shortened 
form of “qualisign”, ranges over more than orgasms. So, to show how the 
foregoing lesson about the limits of linguistic description generalizes, I 
want to repeat my ordinary knowledge argument with another, less pro-
vocative, example: what is it like to taste/smell durian fruit?
This is a useful example because, unlike orgasms, many people have 
no clue what this qualia is. It is therefore interesting to listen to a dialogue 
between those who have tried durian and those who have not. Those who 
once ate the fruit invariably employ the same appeal to analogy discussed 
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earlier. Yet, such appeals stand a chance of working only if they relate an 
unknown experience to a known one. If, for instance, I compare the smell 
of durian to the Indian cooking spice asafoetida, my comparison will not 
improve your epistemic lot if you have never smelled asafoetida.
Those eager to figure out what we are talking about can thus turn to 
the internet for guidance. The Wikipedia (2019) entry for “Durian” gives 
the following quote from Alfred Russell Wallace:
The five cells are silky-white within, and are filled with a mass of firm, 
cream-coloured pulp, containing about three seeds each. This pulp is 
the edible part, and its consistence and flavour are indescribable. A rich 
custard highly flavoured with almonds gives the best general idea of it, 
but there are occasional wafts of flavour that call to mind cream-cheese, 
onion-sauce, sherry-wine, and other incongruous dishes. [ . . . ] It is nei-
ther acidic nor sweet nor juicy; yet it wants neither of these qualities [ . . . ].
Wikipedia (2019) also cites the food and travel writer Richard Ster-
ling, who describes the fruit’s odour as “pig-shit, turpentine and onions, 
garnished with a gym sock” and adds that “[o]ther comparisons have 
been made with the [thick yellowish musky-odoured substance found 
in a sac near the anus of the civet], sewage, stale vomit, skunk spray and 
used surgical swabs.”
To the outsider, it is not at all clear how this eclectic barrage of ad-
jectives is supposed to sum. Looking for more precise language, one can 
consult scientific papers detailing the chemical composition of the durian 
fruit (e.g., Li et al. 2017). Since, for every unfamiliar term one encounters, 
one can search the internet to one’s satisfaction, the resources currently at 
our disposal are the closest we can realistically get to the domain-specific 
omniscience stipulated in Jackson’s knowledge argument. Still, the me-
dium is limited.
To overcome those limitations, one can add behavioural observations. 
On YouTube, for example, there are numerous videos of people trying 
durian fruit for the first time. Once again the medium, while richer, is 
limited. Far from helping, these videos only reinforce the sense that this 
is truly a quality that one must experience oneself.
Given that Mary the neuroscientist suffers only from a local ignorance, 
my suggestion is that we can find an unknown quality that puts us in her 
situation—without being raised in a black-and-white environment from 
birth. So, if one believes that the words, numbers, and diagrams employed 
in scientific practice do not have the sort of limits that proponents of qualia 
argue they do, one can drop the speculations and actually test the situation.
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Such a test comes in three stages that map onto the segmented timeline 
discussed earlier. The initial period consists in not knowing the relevant 
word. That time has passed, since by now one already knows that there is 
a fruit called “durian”. Whether one can occupy the second stage depends 
on one’s personal history. If one has tasted durian before, it is too late to 
turn back the clock and recapture one’s pre-qualitative ignorance. Hence, 
the people who can test my ordinary knowledge argument are those who 
have learned the word “durian” but have never tasted or smelled the actual 
fruit (for convenience, I use the verb “to eat” to capture both tasting and 
smelling).
For people in that position who wish to conduct the test, the protocol 
is quite simple. Browse the internet until you are confident that you know 
what it’s like to eat durian fruit. This could take a while, but there are no 
time constraints. In fact, the longer the period of online research, the more 
conclusive the test becomes. Read and watch everything you can, short of 
tasting and smelling an actual durian. Transition from the second to the 
third stage happens when, mimicking Mary’s emergence, one comes face 
to face with the genuine article. So, when confidence in your internet-
gleaned knowledge by description reaches its apex, go to your nearest 
Asian grocery store, purchase a durian, and enjoy. Then, pay attention.
As a spoiler alert, we will have a taste test at the end of my talk. Ad-
mittedly, the novelty of eating a fruit cannot match the intensity of an 
orgasm, but it should nevertheless give you a vivid appreciation of the 
core situation that drives my philosophical work on qualia. The question 
one must ask oneself upon actually eating the fruit is the following: is it 
really the case that experiencing the durian fruit first-hand added nothing 
to one’s knowledge?
Like any serious experiment, it is important to answer this question 
in an unbiased way. So, ideally, tasters should train themselves beforehand 
in the methods outlined in Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi’s excellent 
manual on phenomenology (2008: 21–28). If one wants to trade this 
approach for the “heterophenomenology” outlined by Daniel Dennett 
(2003), then one can conduct the test with a large sample of random 
people and ask them whether eating the actual fruit added something to 
their knowledge by description. If the overwhelming answer given is “Yes”, 
then one has to take these reports at face-value, since phenomenology and 
heterophenomenology exhaust the logical terrain.
Even so, to the extent that phenomenology and heterophenomenol-
ogy (i.e., regular science) both express their results in linguistic signs, 
both face limitations. What can one say about the new experience that 
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one undergoes when one finally eats durian? Since the issue pertains to 
the limits of language-compatible knowledge, and since the conclusion is 
that qualia escape the net of linguistic description, it might be appropriate 
to follow Wittgenstein’s (1921: 89) famous seventh clause and shut up. At 
some point, theorizing must stop.
A Few Words about Staying Silent
Now, one might worry that “[t]he idea of ‘Tractatus 7.1’—an explanation 
of Tractatus 7—seems like a contradiction, or a violation” (Caws 2006: 11). 
I am not so sure. Of course, if one conducts one’s inquiry as a philosopher 
of language, then doubling-down on language when one has reached the 
breaking point of language is a misguided strategy. That is why I switch 
from philosophy of language to philosophy of signs. Indeed, the advantage 
of semiotic inquiry over regular philosophy of language is that one gets all 
the resources afforded by linguistic signs, plus other non-verbal resources, 
such as indices and icons. In this way, an account of consciousness growing 
out of Peirce’s semiotic work can provide tools to demystify the “show” 
portion of Wittgenstein’s remarks.
Such demystification is sorely needed. For example, near the end of his 
Tractatus, Wittgenstein makes three rapid-fire claims: “There are, indeed, 
things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. 
They are what is mystical” (1921, section 6.522: 89; emphasis in original). 
This is an unfortunate cluster of claims, since one can accept that some 
experiences cannot be put into words and are indeed manifest—all while 
denying that this silence and self-evidence are in any way “mystical”. Even 
if we suppose that the conditional “If x is mystical, then x is ineffable” is 
true, there is no valid inference from that premise to the conclusion “If 
x is ineffable, then x is mystical.” It takes a biconditional to license that 
inference, but we have no reason whatsoever to endorse an equivalence 
between ineffability and mysticism.
Much the opposite, I regard the work of sub-verbal signs to be wholly 
consistent with the scientific method. After all, if a naturalist “goes through 
the trouble of taking a flat-Earther into space and asks that sceptic to 
look out the window, it is expected that the verdict rendered by such an 
experience will be decisive. If, upon viewing our spherical planet from 
space, our interlocutor continues to maintain that the Earth is flat, we 
are fully within our rational rights to dismiss that interlocutor and halt 
our efforts at persuasion” (Champagne 2020: 163). Epistemologists like 
Wilfrid Sellars (1956) have argued that such appeals cannot hold sway in 
rational contexts, but I would argue that, in assessing the truth of claims 
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(scientific or otherwise), conscious experience is paramount (see Cham-
pagne 2016). In assessing whether qualia are present in our conscious 
lives, things should be no different.
That is not to say that there are no smart people who deny qualia. 
However, many of the usual objections to Jackson’s argument about Mary 
cease to apply when it comes to my version involving durian. It would 
be bizarre, for instance, to hold that, when one experiences the fruit in 
question, all that one acquires is some sort of “know-how” (Nemirow 
2007). Maybe one learned how to crack open the durian’s spiky shell—I 
am willing to grant that. But, the idea that tastes and smells are skills, even 
if it fits well with a functionalist input-output scheme, makes little sense 
to me. The so-called “ability hypothesis” is only plausible where abilities 
are involved. Here, I detect none.
One could also resist the conclusion about a novel experiential quality 
by replying that one could and should have searched the internet more 
extensively beforehand. Fair enough. After all, my ordinary knowledge 
argument cannot have the force of Jackson’s version, because my version 
concedes that a person wishing to take the bookish route will never attain 
omniscience. You will die before you are awarded all the PhDs needed to 
be a super-expert on durians (or orgasms). Surely, though, such epistemic 
limitations should not bother a naturalist. I do not think the novelty of a 
first-hand encounter will dissipate by engaging in more detailed prepara-
tory studies. If one points out that this conclusion is not fully established 
because it involves a partially-informed subject, then I count that as a 
virtue, since we are all partially-informed subjects.
A more interesting and less explored issue in the vicinity would be 
to ask what would happen if the internet in my experimental design was 
enhanced to include tastes and smells. The attempt to simulate smells 
is as old as perfume, but in the 1960s special theatres tried to enhance 
movie-goers’ experience with aroma dispensers. Although the smells 
could be released, they lingered on, to the point that customers became 
nauseated with them. A virtual reality company named All these Worlds 
has recently developed a scent collar that uses wireless technology to 
emit up to ten custom scents. These scents stop when the airflow stops. 
Cognitive engineers are hoping that these aromas will trigger memories 
and thus powerful emotions. Those trying to simulate tastes are after 
even bigger game. Indeed, the company named Project Nourished pitches 
its research and development program by asking: what if you could eat 
anything you want without regret? Enjoying conscious qualia without 
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coming into contact with the usual physical substrate would be the Holy 
Grail of weight loss.
Yet, whatever design engineers eventually arrive at, that design will 
be answerable to one crucial constraint, namely that the felt end-result 
must resemble what(ever) one wants to evoke. In other words, scientists 
are looking for better and better icons.
Unpacking the Expression “So That’s What It’s Like!”
An icon is a sign that refers to its object by resembling its object. If a leads 
to a′, then a gets the label of “sign-vehicle” and a′ gets the label of “object”, 
but that sense of direction can just as well be reversed, because similarity 
is a symmetrical relation. It is also, at minimum, a two-place relation, 
in this case between a and a′ (which become triadically related when 
interpreted). Since the ultimate form of resemblance would be complete 
replacement, the best icon would be a sign that is its object. Hence, the 
ultimate way for an internet user to learn the smell, taste, and texture of 
a durian is to order one online.
Of course, if you eat an actual durian, you get the physical substrate 
and thus the calories. Yet, given that the qualia and the token thing always 
come together, can we really distinguish the experiential quality from the 
thing that prompts it? Much of my work over the past decade has been 
devoted to unpacking the persistent sense that, as bizarre as it may seem, 
we can make such a distinction.
As I recount in my book Consciousness and the Philosophy of Signs 
(Champagne 2018), Peirce’s term “qualia” got picked up by analytic 
philosophers, but the theoretical framework behind it remained mostly 
ignored. Going back to Peirce’s original formulation can thus shed light 
on the ideas and faculties that risk making the qualitative dimension of 
consciousness look foreign.
Peirce writes that “[a] Qualisign is a quality which is a sign. It cannot 
actually act as a sign until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing 
to do with its character as a sign” (1903: EP2.291). For example, if I want 
to convey to you the vibrant hue of Batwoman’s hair by using an exemplar 
instead of a word, it doesn’t matter whether I use a red wig or Santa’s suit, 
since the vehicle that will let interpretation reach the sign’s intended object 
is the colour, not the thing that bears it. This applies to all qualities. As 
a matter of empirical fact, we humans can indeed distinguish between a 
putrid smelling thing and a putrid smell. One must be careful, however, 
to construe that distinction only in a weak sense, otherwise one will lapse 
into a reification of the quality at hand. Taking stock in an unbiased way 
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of the before-and-after transition that happens when one eats a durian 
should therefore remain instructive.
As Jackson put it in his classic paper, “when [Mary] is let out of the 
black-and-white room [ . . . ] she will not say ‘ho, hum.’” (1986: 291). The 
same goes for people trying durian for the first time. As the YouTube 
videos attest, first time eaters are everything but indifferent to their novel 
conscious experience. Like Mary, none of them say “Meh.” Similarly, I 
doubt participants to my ordinary knowledge argument will say “I could 
have worked all this out before by making some more purely logical in-
ferences” (Jackson 1986: 292). Hence, one’s first orgasm or durian is not 
just novel, it is surprising.
We experience surprise only when we are exposed to something genu-
inely external to our habitual expectations. As Peirce was fond of saying, 
we cannot startle ourselves merely by saying “Boo!” (1903: EP2.195). The 
sense of surprise that accompanies a first contact with a new quality is 
thus something that any adequate theory of the mind must square with 
(or at least do justice to).
In my estimate, the expression “So that’s what it’s like to experi-
ence . . . ” has been inadequately analyzed in the mainstream philosophical 
literature. Today, I cannot do justice to the complex tissue of issues that 
this expression raises, but one way to summarize my discontent with its 
current treatment would be to say that, while analytic philosophers of 
mind tackle their subject with twofold distinctions inherited mainly from 
Bertrand Russell, I think we should be tackling the subject with threefold 
distinctions inherited from Peirce.
So, while it is customary to distinguish between types and tokens, I 
think we need to distinguish between types, tokens, and tones. Moreover, 
while it is customary in the current literature to distinguish between 
knowledge by description and knowledge by acquaintance (Knowles and 
Raleigh 2020), I think acquaintance is a genus with two species, such that 
we need to distinguish between knowledge by indexical acquaintance and 
knowledge by iconic acquaintance (although I prefer to avoid the latter 
expression and use simply “iconicity”).
A Methodology for Unpacking the Expression  
“So That’s What It’s Like!”
My argument involving orgasms and durians hopefully prompts a realiza-
tion that there is a genuine problem here. Whether and to what extent it 
constitutes a “hard” problem is another question. A lot of people think it 
is (Chalmers 1995). However, I have inherited from Wittgenstein (c. 1951) 
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and my doctoral grandfather (Doktorgrossvater) John McDowell (1994) 
a suspicion that some problems that occupy professional philosophers 
are, to put it bluntly, made-up problems, at least in part. When this is the 
case, what is required is not more ardent theorizing—much less extra 
funding—but rather a kind of “therapeutic” philosophizing that aims to 
disabuse us of unhelpful ideas and replace them with a different vantage.
To achieve such a fresh vantage, it is often useful to reconnect with 
defunct ways of seeing things. So, while I am not (and have no wish to 
become) a historian, my attempt to retrace the origins of mainstream as-
sumptions leads me to engage with the past. This is an unusual approach, 
since “[p]hilosophers of mind seldom discuss or investigate, more than 
cursorily, the history of the interrelated concepts of mind, consciousness, 
experience, and the physical world that they rely upon in their theoriz-
ing” (Livingston 2004: 1). Frank Jackson, for instance, recently told me 
that, prior to reading my book, he had no idea that his argument was 
formulated centuries earlier by John Locke (in his Essay, book 2, chapter 
1, paragraph 7), the same philosopher who coined the term “semiotics”. 
As for Jackson’s knowledge of Peirce, an Australian colleague of mine once 
told me that, when she asked Jackson years ago to supervise her budding 
dissertation on Peirce, Jackson replied that he knew two things about the 
American thinker: “First, he is mentioned in [David M.] Armstrong’s book 
on universals. Second, wasn’t he a drunk?” Jackson’s 2010 book Language, 
Names, and Information, shows that his engagement with Peirce never 
moved past that stage. So, despite titling his classic paper “Epiphenomenal 
Qualia”, Jackson never explored the fact that the term qualia was pulled 
from a sophisticated semiotic account.
As someone privy to the vast but vastly underexplored writings of 
Peirce, I try to rectify historical oversights like these. I also tend to give 
medieval philosophy more credence than the norm; a reflex I inherited 
from the late John Deely (2001).
My methodological prescription, in a nutshell, is this. First, switch 
from philosophy of language to the wider disciplinary ambit of philosophy 
of signs, since the latter encompasses the former while offering still more 
semiotic resources. Second, find out where your concepts came from, 
historically, so as to be more critical about the merits and demerits of 
those concepts. Third, get as clear as you can about key Peircean notions, 
notably prescissive abstraction, the type/token/tone distinction, and the 
subdivision between indexical and iconic acquaintance. Then, once all 
this has been done, revisit the usual pro-qualia arguments like Jackson’s 
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knowledge argument. My sense is that, if one follows those steps in earnest, 
many things will fall into place (or at least look less mysterious).
To be clear, my strategy does not consist in asking whether qualia 
exist. Far from being neutral, mainstream debates about consciousness 
are typically permeated by a fear that, if we acknowledge the presence of 
experiential qualities in our mental lives, we will somehow cede terrain to 
a bogeyman called “dualism”. At the risk of holding a minority view, I have 
no time for this traditional dispute, primarily because I fail to see what 
is at stake in it. When did philosophy of mind become a department of 
metaphysics? I certainly didn’t get that memo. Metaphysics is a legitimate 
and highly interesting field of inquiry (see Champagne 2015), but it clouds 
one’s thinking in philosophy of mind to think about it. So, while Jackson’s 
preferred conclusion was that “physicalism is incomplete” (1982: 130), I 
prefer to conclude that the representational range of physicalism’s preferred 
signs is incomplete, insofar as verbal and mathematical symbols can carry 
a great deal of information but not everything into Mary’s confines.
My goal is thus to get clear on the various stated and unstated semiotic 
assumptions involved in discussions of consciousness. My hypothesis is 
that unnoticed conceptual omissions are often what render consciousness 
mysterious. If someone like Dennett (1988) can uncharitably explain away 
the intuitions that lead people to believe in qualia, surely I can charitably 
explain those intuitions.
I am impressed by the idea that the only sign inside Mary’s room 
capable of representing the red things outside her room would be a sign 
that is red. So, instead of adding an extra stuff to the standard ontology of 
matter, I recommend that we add an extra sign—the icon—to the standard 
repertoire of indices and symbols. In this regard, I side with philosophers 
of mind (known as “phenomenal concept strategists”) who argue that 
worries about qualitative mental states stem from the special concepts 
used to describe those states. I am not sure whether such an approach is 
modest or ambitious. In a way, it could be seen as modest, since it does not 
pretend to yield an account of how immaterial minds arise from purely 
material substrates. I instead want to clarify a set of distinctively human 
abilities that, when misunderstood or ignored, have the power to alienate 
us from a familiar portion of the human condition.
Yet, this search for a dissolution instead of a solution could be seen 
as ambitious, because it requires important modifications of what are, 
for many analytic philosophers, settled distinctions. You just have to be 
a substance dualist, property dualist, or materialist monist, yet I dismiss 
most of those “isms” as unproductive, to the point where I don’t even 
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mention them. In so doing, I willingly jettison much of my schooling. Or, 
to be more precise, I use my schooling to determine which assumptions 
ought to be jettisoned. That might be revolutionary (in Thomas Kuhn’s 
sense) or just plain effrontery. Still, for better or worse, rethinking the 
qualitative aspect of the mind in Peircean semiotic terms is the approach 
I have essayed in Consciousness and the Philosophy of Signs.
Outline of a Possible Semiotic Account
Concretely, my foray results in the following account:
• Mastery of language is necessary.
• Mastery of language is not sufficient.
• Indexical exposure to an actual token is necessary.
• Indexical exposure to an actual token is not sufficient.
• The token must have the right quality.
• Provided that the token has the right quality, it can be any token.
• The presence of similar tokens is inessential.
• The presence of this token is in some way inessential.
Let me briefly comment on each claim.
Mastery of language is necessary. Many creatures are conscious, but 
creatures capable of worrying about their consciousness are creatures ca-
pable of using (lay or specialized) language about consciousness. I contend 
that we must stop talking at some point, but I want to be equally adamant 
that what happens during such a period of silence is informative only be-
cause we talked about it beforehand. In fact, I would suggest that, the more 
we talk about a quality, the more momentous our iconic-acquaintance 
becomes. Experiential qualities do not depend on conventions to be what 
they are, but we burrow into those relation-less qualia from a network of 
conventional relations and accepted practices that never vanishes.
Mastery of language is not sufficient. As the knowledge argument 
establishes, we cannot accomplish everything by talking more.
Indexical exposure to an actual token is necessary. As the knowledge 
argument also establishes, you need to actually eat a durian fruit in order 
to appreciate what it’s like. Nothing I say in my book changes the need 
for such a direct contact.
Indexical exposure to an actual token is not sufficient. Even if we grant 
that Mary will have to exit, it remains an open question how to refer to the 
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qualitative experience that she will have. The experience that one is having 
is happening here now, so it is reasonable to convey it with a demonstrative. 
However, the expression “This one here now” does not convey what is here 
now. The indices jointly succeed in isolating a region of experience, but 
if an account does not go beyond this indexicality, it risks occluding the 
additional iconic work that renders such an ostensive appeal informative.
The token must have the right quality. Since the qualitative content 
matters, if I bring you face to face with, say, a jackfruit, you won’t get ac-
quainted with durian. Similarly, if what Mary sees upon leaving is blue, 
she learns blue, not red.
Provided that the token has the right quality, it can be any token. At the 
point of purchase, I had to make a choice between several almost-identical 
durians. I picked this one, but the specimen immediately next to it would 
have worked just fine to convey the quality in question. Similarly, Mary can 
learn red from a red rose or a red apple—or a red whatever. That is why 
Peirce writes that “[a] Qualisign [ . . . ] cannot actually act as a sign until it 
is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its character as a 
sign” (1903: EP2.291). Moreover, the important thing is being of the right 
quality, not belonging to the same natural kind. Even within the natural 
kind “monthong durian” that I bought, distinct tokens will present slight 
variations in their flavours, so a ripe taste will obviously differ from an 
unripe one. But, at the proper level of analysis, an unripe taste does not 
differ from another unripe one. Hence, I could imagine a durian-lover 
looking to recreate the experience, not just of any monthong durian, but 
of a memorable individual that they enjoyed on a particular occasion. 
Properties that are “accidental” from the point of view of classification thus 
have their own “essence” from the point of view of philosophy of mind.
The final two theses bring us squarely into contrary-to-fact territory:
The presence of similar tokens is inessential. The individual durian 
specimen present before us is related to other individual durians currently 
located, say, at the Asian market. As members of the same species, they 
share a common lineage, so when one finds out what it’s like to eat this 
particular durian in Toronto, one finds out what all durian are like, includ-
ing those in Malaysia. This looks like action at a distance. Yet, suppose 
that those other durians in Toronto and Malaysia did not exist. This lack 
of existence would extinguish the indexical bond connecting this thing 
to other things. However, such an absence would do nothing to change 
the iconic power of the token stimulating one’s sense organs. Even as the 
last durian on Earth, a single individual remains similar to anything that 
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would be like it. So, while similarity is a two-place relation, the quality that 
grounds similarity can be housed wholly in a given relatum.
The presence of this token is in some way inessential. While the need for 
an actual exposure suggests that one can capture the qualia at hand with a 
purely causal account, icons have distinctive modal properties that causal-
ity fails to capture. As we have just seen, icons don’t require the objects 
they signify to actually exist. What’s more, the referential work enabled 
by qualities does not even pivot on their actual physical instantiation, 
as necessary as that instantiation might be. To see why, go further and 
suppose that this actual durian before us did not exist. It seems sensible 
to say that, were it to exist, it would be similar to any other durians, were 
they to exist too. The philosophical moral is that qualities do not depend 
on their actual material instantiation in order to fix their iconic scope. It 
suffices that a quality be such-and-such (as opposed to being thus-and-so) 
to establish that the quality would be like any such-and-such. That is why 
you can’t destroy the colour red (or the inherent referential potential of 
that colour) simply by burning a red rose. This, on my diagnosis, is the 
strange-but-true feature that generates confusion over whether qualia 
demonstrate or fail to demonstrate “intentionality” or aboutness (see Lalor 
1999). In iconicity, both sides of this perennial debate are right.
I struggled for years to accept some of the claims that I have listed, 
which form a minefield of potential confusion. To be clear, the suppositions 
of absence at play in the account just outlined go against the hard facts, 
since there is a durian on some market shelf somewhere, just as there is 
(and indeed must be) a durian before whoever eats it. But, whatever insight 
into the distinctive taste and smell of durian is afforded by a particular 
token does not hinge on the existence of other tokens. It does not even 
hinge on the existence of this token, since it could just as well be swapped 
for another. What is involved when we pinpoint the qualities at the heart 
of conscious experience is thus an artificial separation that Peirce called 
prescissive abstraction.
Peirce took this from Duns Scotus, who defined the “formal distinc-
tion” in contrast with the “real distinction”. A real distinction allows one to 
keep a thing present while factually making another thing absent, whereas 
a formal distinction can only suppose that the other thing is absent. It is 
this ability to prescind, I argue, that underpins a common locution like 
“I don’t mean this durian flesh, I mean its flavour.” That fragment of lan-
guage makes it seem as if the flavour can exist apart from the flesh. As a 
brute fact of our universe, it cannot. We are nevertheless endowed with 
the ability to consider that flavour apart from the flesh.
 Book Reviews 459
Precission is thus crucial to understanding the qualitative dimension 
of consciousness. A mental state usually brings into play a stimulus and a 
response. John Dewey was right in his early psychological papers to warn 
that, since any organism is coupled to its environment in an embodied 
way, this entire “reflex arc” must be psychology’s minimal unit of analysis 
(Dewey 1896). The same warning can be found in the seminal biological 
work of Jakob von Uexküll (1926: 155), who focused on the perceptual 
and motor “function-circle” as a whole. Contemporary analytic philoso-
phy of mind, where functionalism dominates, has mostly followed suit. 
However, a philosophical account is not a psychological or biological 
account, so with Peirce I argue that there is a way to meaningfully allude 
to the qualitative character of a stimulus, apart from whatever response 
it stimulates or other detectable effects it has.
We humans have available to us a perspective that makes sense of 
qualia, but not only must this perspective go against natural science, it 
must go against the deliverances of phenomenology too. Qualia are sup-
posed to be what they are irrespective of the various causal or inferential 
roles they enter into. But, to quote Dewey, we are no more conscious of 
“this or that color or sound by itself ” than we are “of motion as motion” 
(1896: 369). Hence, whatever lets us know qualia, it isn’t introspection.
Conclusion
To conclude, I do not think we fully understand this ability to focus on 
some aspect to the exclusion of another. Yet, I do not think we need to 
fully understand this ability in order to acknowledge that we possess it. 
I am not sure how much light my written work has managed to cast on 
prescission, iconicity, and their roles in conveying qualities, but studying 
these notions strikes me as more promising than figuring out how ghostly 
mind-stuff magically arises from inert matter.
My work instead seeks to understand what, from a strict semiotic 
standpoint, happens when people see a new colour, experience their first 
orgasm, or consume an exotic fruit and exclaim “Now I know what you 
mean.” Subjects don’t even have to verbally express this iconic acquain-
tance. Far from being mystical or inimical to the conduct of natural science, 
I want to place such silent nodding at the core of all inter-subjective under-
standing. I believe this can done if we carry some powerful but neglected 
ideas from Peirce over to mainstream debates about consciousness.
As I said at the outset, any loose ends I may have generated today are 
likely tied in my book. What you will find there are conceptual tools that 
let one look at mental goings-on in a renewed and, I would argue, more 
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fruitful way. Such a project of applying philosophy of signs to conscious-
ness cannot be completed by a single person, so hopefully the remarks I 
made today will be built upon by co-workers.
In any event, in keeping with my insistence that language has its limits, 
I now end my talk and invite you to become iconically acquainted with a 
strange and wondrous fruit.2
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